零售商主导型供应链采用RFID技术演化机理研究  

Evolutionary Mechanism of Using RFID Technology on Retailer-Led Supply Chain

作　　者：潘新宇[1,2] 赵道致[1] 王文杰[3] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学管理与经济学部,天津300072 [2]唐山学院会计系,唐山063000 [3]天津大学求是学部,天津300072

出　　处：《天津大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第3期211-216,共6页Journal of Tianjin University：Social Sciences

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472134)

摘　　要：针对库存管理中商品损耗引起的库存不准确问题,研究了RFID技术应用在零售商主导型供应链中的演化机理。采用报童模型和演化博弈方法,建立了RFID技术应用前后博弈双方的收益模型及支付矩阵,分析了上下游企业短期和长期的演化稳定策略。研究表明,短期内零售商的收益不变,博弈双方均选择不引入RFID技术;当零售商的库存损耗率满足约束条件时,长期范围内双方的投资决策受RFID的标签成本、零售商的成本分担比例和惩罚成本的影响。Targeting at the inventory discrepancy problem caused by shrinkage in stock control,this paper conducted a research on evolutionary mechanism of RFID technology investment in a retailer-led supply chain. Using the newsvendor model and evolutionary game,the revenue model of supply chain and a pay-off matrix were constructed by considering two situations of adopting RFID and not adopting RFID,and evolutionary stable strategies of the upstream and downstream enterprises were analyzed in short and long term perspective. The result shows that the revenue of retailers is invariant,and both sides of game don＇t install RFID technology. When the retailer＇ s inventory shrinkage rate meets the constraint condition,within the scope of long-term the investment decisions of both sides are influenced by RFID tag cost,the retailer＇ s cost share proportion and of the punishment cost.

关 键 词：无线射频识别 演化博弈 零售商主导 报童模型 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理]