竞争性供应链下再制造产品的回收渠道研究  

Research on Collecting Strategies in the Closed-loop Supply Chain with Chain to Chain Competition

作　　者：李晓静[1] 艾兴政[1] 唐小我[1] 

机构地区：[1]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都610054

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第3期90-98,共9页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005);国家自然科学基金资助项目(70772070)

摘　　要：基于链与链竞争市场,以制造商和零售商集中化结构下闭环供应链模型为基准,考察了分散化结构下不同回收渠道对供应链各成员利润的影响,并识别了每种回收渠道选择的条件与均衡特征。最后从回收率、制造商与零售商实现共赢的角度讨论了最优回收渠道结构。研究发现:无论是集中化结构还是分散化结构下制造商对回收渠道的选择均取决于产品竞争强度与回收补偿价格,这显著不同于零售商与回收率对回收渠道的选择不依赖任何因素。同时,分散结构下若回收补偿价格较低且产品竞争强度弱于某一水平,或回收补偿价格较高且产品竞争强度控制在合适范围内时,选择制造商回收结构实现了制造商与零售商利润的双赢。We investigate reverse channel choices under a close-loop supply chain system consisting of two manufactures selling substitutable products to two exclusive retailers when they face chain-to-chain competition. The models under a centralized structure provide a benchmark scenario to compare with the ones under decentralized structure related to the equilibrium decisions of members in two supply chains. Subsequently, we identify the optimal reverse channel structure insight from manufactures and retailers completing a win-win situation. We find that： （ 1 ） Under the centralized structure, the choice of reverse channels for manufacturers depends on the competitive intensity of products and the buy-back price. When the competitive intensity of products is below a certain boundary, manufacturers or retailers can benefit from a direction collection. While the competitive intensity is above this boundary, the third-party responsible for collection has advantages for manufacturers or retailers. Simultaneously, when manufacturers formulate the high buy-back price the boundary will increase as the buy-back price increases. When manufacturers formulate the low buy-back price, the boundary will decrease if the buy-back price increases. （2） Under the decentralized structure, the choice of reverse channel for manufacturers also depends on the competitive intensity of products and the buy-back price, when manufacturers formulate the low buy-back price, manufacturers can benefit from a direction collection by themselves if the intensity of supply chain competition is not sufficiently high. With the increase of competitive intensity, manufacturers prefer the retailer charging with collecting products to the other structures. The allocation of the collection responsibility to the third-party can reduce firms＇ risk and enhance their competitiveness if competitive intensity is high. In contrast, when manufacturers formulate the high buy-back price, the structure of retailers engaging in collection is most beneficial to

关 键 词：闭环供应链 链与链竞争 回收渠道 制造商与零售商共赢 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]