应得与道德价值——罗尔斯的应得批判之批判  

Desert and Moral Value: Response to Rawl's Criticism to the Desert

作　　者：王立[1] 

机构地区：[1]吉林大学哲学基础理论研究中心暨哲学社会学院

出　　处：《吉林大学社会科学学报》2016年第4期160-167,192,共8页Jilin University Journal Social Sciences Edition

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(14JJD720023);吉林大学廉政建设专项研究课题(2015LZY024)

摘　　要：在当代正义理论中,应得正义观是平等正义观最重要的批评者和挑战者。罗尔斯认为应得主要反映的是道德价值,并利用"道德价值与分配份额无关"来反对应得在分配正义中的地位和作用。分析罗尔斯正义理论中"无知之幕"的道德理由、差别原则的融贯性问题以及公平的机会平等原则在整个正义原则中的独特地位,可以看出,应得作为先于正义原则的基本道德价值判断,已经被罗尔斯所接受并运用于正义原则的道德推理之中。应得与分配正义密切相关。Among the modern theories of Justice,Desert is the major critique that challenges the Concept of Equality. In Raw ls' opinion,Desert is mainly a moral value,and he denied that Desert can have any place in distributive justice by the argument w hich states 'moral value is non-related to distributive shares'. By analyzing the moral reasons in the'Veil of Ignorance',the coherence problem of Difference Principle and the Principle of Fair Equality of Opportunity in Raw ls' theory of justice,it could be recognized that Desert as a basic judgment to moral values a priori to principles of justice,is accepted and applied in the moral reasoning of the principles of justice. Desert is intrinsically correlated to distributive justice.

关 键 词：罗尔斯 分配正义 应得 平等 道德价值 正义原则 

分 类 号：D091[政治法律—政治学]