董事会资本、CEO股权激励与企业R&D投入——基于中国A股高科技电子行业上市公司的经验证据  

The Impact of Board Capital and CEO Shareholding Incentive on Enterprise R&D Investment:Empirical Evidence from the A-share listed High-tech Electronic Companies in China

作　　者：严若森[1] 钱晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,湖北武汉430072

出　　处：《经济管理》2016年第7期60-70,共11页Business and Management Journal ( BMJ )

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"基于双重委托代理理论模型构建的股权集中型公司治理最优化研究"(70502024);教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-11-0412)

摘　　要：本文以2012—2014年中国A股高科技电子行业上市公司为研究样本,以CEO股权激励为调节变量,就董事会资本(人力资本与社会资本)对企业R&D投入的影响关系进行了实证研究。研究结果表明:(1)董事会人力资本及董事会社会资本均与企业R&D投入显著正相关;(2)CEO股权激励对董事会人力资本对企业R&D投入的影响关系存在正向调节效应,且CEO持股比例越高,该调节效应越明显;(3)CEO股权激励对董事会社会资本对企业R&D投入的影响关系存在负向调节效应。本文的启示在于,高科技电子行业上市公司及其他类似R&D特征明显的企业,既须重视董事会人力资本与董事会社会资本对企业R&D投入的战略意义,亦须基于自身R&D投入水平目标而适度配置其CEO持股比例。R＆D is an essential strategy choice for an enterprise to keep innovation capability and the R＆D theoretical research has been a hot topic in the field of corporate governance. It has been proven that R＆D investment with high spending could improve an enterprise＇ s innovation capability. In the industries of high technology, such as the electronic industry, the enterprises face much more fierce competition than others because of the rapid shifting and improvement. The electronic enterprises tend to invest on R＆D for building blocks for competitors in one way, and improve the market performance in another side. With this background, the purpose of this study is to discuss synergy effect of board capital and CEO shareholding incentives on Chinese enterprises＇ R＆D investment. This study aims to verify whether the CEO shareholding incentive has a positive moderating effect on the interaction between board capital and enterprise R＆D investment. This study takes A-share listed companies of high-tech electronic industry in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange as the samples ,uses the data of 142 firms from the period of 2012 to 2014. The effects of board capital and the moderating effect of CEO compensation on R＆D investment are tested by the use of lagged regression. The results of lagging hierarchical regression analysis contain three statistical models： model 1 contains all the control variables except for CEO tenure, having a marked negative correlation with dependent variable; Model 2 takes the hypothesized main effect of board capital into consideration in addition with the control variables; Model 3 includes the main effect of dependent variables, moderated effects between CEO compensation and board capital, together with control variables. Then the mainlyfindings are listed as following： board human capital （industry-specific experiences） and social capital （interlocking ties） are significantly positive with enterprise R＆D investment ratio, which support the hypothesis one; CEO sh

关 键 词：董事会资本 董事会人力资本 董事会社会资本 CEO股权激励 企业R&D投入 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理]