第三方认证下的食品信任品市场均衡形态分析  被引量:1

Food Credence Goods Market Equilibrium Morphology under Third-party Authentication

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作  者:王建华 陆晓博 包含 

机构地区:[1]江南大学商学院,江苏无锡214122

出  处:《工业工程》2016年第3期7-13,29,共8页Industrial Engineering Journal

基  金:国家自然科学基金资助项目(70901034);教育部新世纪优秀人才计划资助项目(NCET-10-0458);教育部人文社会科学规划资助项目(12YJA630007)

摘  要:在将市场中消费者类型分为"敏感"和"迟钝"的基础上,构建了食品信任品市场中先由高质量企业制定第三方认证标签决策,然后低质量企业通过是否伪装第三方认证和传递价格信号向消费者披露产品质量信息的两阶段动态博弈模型,讨论了在仅有"敏感"消费者,仅有"迟钝"消费者,以及"敏感"和"迟钝"消费者并存的3种不同市场结构中,实现市场均衡的条件。研究结果表明,无论高质量生产企业是否采用第三方认证标签,在满足一定条件下都可以实现市场的分离均衡,并且在实施第三方认证标签制度的食品信任品市场上,在政府惩罚力度较小、高质量产品定价较低、敏感消费者比例较高时,都会产生低质量生产者伪装成高质量生产者的动机。By classifying consumers into “sensitive” and“unresponsive”, a two-stage dynamic game mod-el is constructed .In stage 1 , high-quality firms decide whether to implement the third-party certification system and set prices .In stage 2, low-quality firms decide whether to camouflage certification and transfer to consumers price signals connected with products ’ quality information .The conditions to realize separa-ting equilibrium of the market under three different circumstances are also discussed :with only“sensitive”consumers , with only “unresponsive” consumers , and with both “sensitive” and“unresponsive” consum-ers.The result reveals that whether or not the high-quality firms use the third-party certification label, the food credence goods market realizes separating equilibrium under certain conditions .In addition, in the market coexistence of “sensitive” and “unresponsive” consumers, when the power of government supervi-sion and punishment is weak , prices of high-quality products are comparatively low , and when the percent-age of“sensitive” consumers is high , low-quality firms tend to have the motivation to be disguised as high-quality firms.

关 键 词:第三方认证 市场均衡 动态博弈 食品 

分 类 号:F713[经济管理—产业经济]

 

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