银行风险承担行为监管——基于薪酬互换的实验研究  

Regulationof BankRisk-Taking:An Experimental Research Based on Compensation Swap

作　　者：张雄[1] 吴祖光[2] 万迪昉[2] 

机构地区：[1]西安电子科技大学经济与管理学院 [2]西安交通大学管理学院

出　　处：《中国经济问题》2016年第4期61-72,共12页China Economic Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71373202)资助

摘　　要：正确激励银行高管能够约束银行的过度风险承担行为。实验研究发现,基于互换方式的监管机制能够显著降低银行的风险承担水平和破产概率。资本结构调整机制也能通过多次博弈达到低风险承担均衡,但是破产概率高,在长期的博弈时,其约束力还会逐步降低,所需监督成本更高。这两种机制均通过约束高管的侵占行为实现对过度风险承担行为的约束,但互换机制在约束侵占行为上更有效。在相对收益方式下股东存在参照点心理,会多次退出交易警告高管。而在绝对收益方式下双方则尽可能不去冒犯对方,形成了长期的互惠互利倾向,有利于形成组织公民行为。The efficient incentive method can constrain the financial top managers＇ excessive risk taking behaviors.The paper proposes a compensation swap contract,which is defined as exchanging top bank managers＇ compensation with a fixed payoff.The experimental study shows that the swap contract can significantly decrease the risk taking and probability of default with lower supervision cost as compared with capital structure adjustment method.Although the capital structure adjustment method can also decrease risk taking,the efficiency is lower and the probability of default and supervision cost are higher.Furthermore,the swap contract is more efficient than the capital adjustment method on the decreasing the top managers＇ expropriation behavior.Under the relative payoff,the shareholders have the cognition problem of reference point and repeatedly warn financial top managers by refusing swap.Under the absolute payoff,the participants do not offend each other with the reciprocity behavior and lead to the organizational citizenship behavior.

关 键 词：风险承担 激励 互换 实验 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.3[经济管理—国民经济]