公共证成与美好生活——至善论自由主义的一条新路径  

Public Justification and the Good Life——A New Approach to Liberal Perfectionism

作　　者：惠春寿[1] 

机构地区：[1]华东师范大学思勉高等人文研究院

出　　处：《政治思想史》2016年第2期98-122,199-200,共25页Journal of the History of Political Thought

摘　　要：公共证成要求国家行为必须得到合理公民的共同接受,据此,许多人对至善论提出了批评,认为它注定无法满足公共证成的要求。然而,由于反对至善论的四个理由——价值多元论、合理公民、自由平等人的观念和中立性——都不能成立,公共证成并没有蕴含反至善论的结论。相反,它允许国家基于个人自主的生活观念而行动。不仅如此,给定社会道德在维系社会合作时的重要作用,公共证成还要求国家推行其他道德上良善的生活方式。因此自由主义归根到底是一种至善论的主张。Most political theorists who believe in public justification regard perfectionism as an illegitimate project,because it requires liberal states to endorse certain conceptions of good life,while the public justification claims that the actions of state should be acceptable by all reasonable citizens. An examination of the four bases of anti-perfectionism,i.e. value pluralism,the conception of reasonableness,Rawls' conceptions of free and equal persons,and the justificatory neutrality,will show that none of them can defeat perfectionism. That means liberal perfectionism is compatible with public justification. For example,the liberal state can commit to the ideal of personal autonomy and still satisfy the requirements of public justification. Moreover, given the significance of social morality,it can also endorse some other conceptions of good life in accordance with the claim of public justification.

关 键 词：自由主义 公共证成 至善论 个人自主 社会道德 

分 类 号：D081[政治法律—政治学]