股票期权激励与高管风险承担的关系——考虑媒体关注的调节作用  

Relationship between Stock Option Incentive and Executive′s Risk-taking:Regulatory Effect of Media Attention

作　　者：屠立鹤 孙世敏[1] 陈怡秀[1] 代玺玲[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110167

出　　处：《技术经济》2016年第7期112-122,共11页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目"社会企业业绩评价体系:基于生命周期视角的研究"(71072122);教育部博士学科点专项基金(博导类)项目"长期报酬;非货币效用及动态基础薪酬的激励效应研究:基于相对价值创造视角"(20130042110032)

摘　　要：依据行权条件和行权有效期将股票期权激励方案分为"高标准型"和"低标准型",利用2006—2013年中国沪深两市实施股票期权激励的上市公司的数据,实证考察了两类样本组中股票期权激励与高管风险承担的关系,以及媒体关注对两者间关系的调节作用。研究发现:"高标准型"股票期权激励与高管风险承担之间存在呈倒U形关系;"低标准型"股票期权激励与高管风险承担之间存在负相关关系;媒体关注度越高,"高标准型"组中两者倒U关系的拐点越滞后,同时"低标准型"组中两者的负相关关系越弱。According to vesting condition and exercising validity period,this paper divides the sample into two categories,namely ＂ high standard＂ and ＂low standard＂.Using the data of listed companies which have implemented stock option incentive in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets in the period of 2006-2013,it studies the relationships between stock option incentive and executive′s risk-taking based two types of enterprise group,and the regulatory effect of media attention on these relationships.The results show as follows：the relationship curve between stock option incentive and executive′s risk-taking presents a inverted-U shape in ＂ high standard＂ group,and the correlation between them is negative in ＂low standard＂ group;the higher the media attention,more lagging behind the turning point of inverted-U relationship in ＂ high standard＂ group,and the weaker the negative relationship in ＂low standard＂ group.

关 键 词：股票期权 期权激励 媒体关注 风险承担 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]