制造商与网络零售商之供应链回购契约协调研究——基于Stackelberg博弈分析  

The Study on Coordination of Supply Chain Buy-back Contract between a Manufacturer and an Online-retailer Based on Stackelberg Game Analysis

作　　者：张庆平[1] 

机构地区：[1]顺德职业技术学院,广东佛山528300

出　　处：《科技和产业》2016年第7期101-105,共5页Science Technology and Industry

基　　金：2015年度佛山哲学社会科学规划基金项目(2015-BZ60)

摘　　要：运用基于经典报童问题的回购契约协调由单一制造商和单一网络零售商构成二阶供应链。构建stackelberg博弈模型和供应链整合模型,并求解算例,据此讨论双方如何运用回购契约,通过调整变量和参数来协调供应链的利润分配并实现供应链的最佳绩效。研究表明,作为主导方的制造商若同时提升批发价和更高倍率的补贴价,自身利润和供应链的总利润将会增加,供应链绩效也会得以改善,但跟随者网络零售商的利润会有所下降。Applying buy-back contract based on a classical newsboy problem to ordinate a two-phased supply chain consisted of a single supplier and a single online retailer.Construct a stackelberg game model and a supply chain integration model,solve a demonstrated example,and discuss two parties how to allocate the supply chain profits and achieve optimum performance of supply chain.The results show that if manufacturer as a leader increases the wholesale price and more subsidized prices,its own profit and gross profit will increase,improving supply chain performance,while online retailer’profit as a follower will reduce.

关 键 词：制造商 网络零售商 回购契约 供应链协调 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F273.7[经济管理—企业管理]