模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的VMI供应链协调  

VMI supply chain coordination considering fuzzy demand and the supplier's fair preference

作　　者：刘云志[1] 樊治平[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院,沈阳110167

出　　处：《系统工程理论与实践》2016年第7期1661-1675,共15页Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(71271051);中央高校基本科研业务经费(N140607001)~~

摘　　要：针对模糊需求且考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI(vendor managed inventory)供应链,依据Cui等提出的不公平厌恶模型,分析了此VMI供应链在批发价格契约下的协调情况.得到的主要结论是:在不利不公平分配情形下,公平偏好供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其为公平偏好系数(零售商势力外生参数)的严格减函数(减函数)且不高于风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,批发价格契约无法使模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI供应链达到协调;在有利不公平分配情形下,公平偏好供应商存在唯一的最优产品生产量,其为公平偏好系数(零售商势力外生参数)的严格增函数(增函数)且不低于风险中性的供应商的最优产品生产量,批发价格契约在一定条件下可使模糊需求下考虑供应商公平偏好的二级VMI供应链达到协调.最后,通过数值实验分析验证了相关研究结论.Abstract For a two-stage vendor managed inventory （VMI） supply chain considering fuzzy demand and the supplier＇s fair preference, the VMI supply chain coordination problem with wholesale price contract is studied based on the unfair aversion model proposed by Cui et al. The conclusions can be obtained as follows： for the situation of disadvantageous unfair allocation, there is a unique optimal production quantity which strictly decreases （decreases） with the fair preference coefficient （retailer＇s exogenous-force parameter） and is less than the optimal production quantity of the risk-neutral supplier, and the wholesale price contract cannot coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain with fuzzy demand and fair preference supplier; for the situation of advantageous unfair allocation, there is a unique optimal production quantity which strictly increases （increases） with the fair preference coefficient （retailer＇s exogenous-force parameter） and is more than the optimal production quantity of the risk-neutral supplier, and the wholesale price contract can coordinate the two-stage VMI supply chain with fuzzy demand and fair preference supplier under certain conditions. Finally, numerical experiments are used to prove the findings.

关 键 词：供应链协调 供应商管理库存(VMI) 模糊需求 公平偏好 批发价格契约 

分 类 号：F272[经济管理—企业管理] O224[经济管理—国民经济]