地方政府融资平台存量债务整改及其有条件重构  

Debt Rectification and Its Conditional Restructuring of Local Government Financing Platforms

作　　者：刘红忠[1] 许友传[1] 

机构地区：[1]复旦大学经济学院,上海200433

出　　处：《复旦学报（社会科学版）》2016年第4期124-130,共7页Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基　　金：国家自然科学基金(项目批准号:71473041);教育部人文社会科学研究基金(项目批准号:14YJC790145)的阶段性研究成果

摘　　要：借新还旧损害了银行债权的总体价值,从市场公平交易的视角来看,在借新还旧中嵌入旧债整改条件是对银行潜在损失的间接和隐性补偿,市场主导型的有条件借新还旧有其理论上的适当性。然而,当前推行的融资平台存量债务整改是在中央政府的明确表态和有关部门的强力推动下进行的,其试图以非市场化方式来矫正市场主体的前期不当行为,这在某种程度上是对市场主体行为的替代和契约精神的破坏。在承认市场经济原则和尊重契约精神的前提下,即使没有中央政府和有关部门的强力推动,银行业金融机构亦有动机进行以市场为基础的有条件借新还旧式债务滚动,其比不允许借新还旧下的政府主导式债务整改可能更优。The study indicates the unconditional debt restructuring of borrowing a new loan to repay an old loan dilutes the overall debts value of banks. There is a rationale,based on market fairness,for banks to rectify irregular or illegal clauses in old debt contracts as a condition for rollover. However,local government financing platforms and local governments maybe use breach of contract spirits as an excuse and refuse to accept the rectification requirements for old debts without the strong push of central government and relevant authorities. The debt restructuring plan under regulatory intervention,in a non-market manner,tries to correct the improper behavior of market players,which to a certain extent is an alternative to the market behaviors and the destruction of contract spirits. Actually,even without regulatory intervention,banks also have incentives to independently implement conditional borrowing a new loan to repay an old loan based on the principle and spirit of fair market trade,which likely to be more appropriate than central government initiatives to push financing platforms or local governments to cooperate with banks to rectify existing debts.

关 键 词：地方政府融资平台 债务重构 复合期权 

分 类 号：F812.5[经济管理—财政学]