网络外部性下链与链竞争纵向联盟和收益共享合同  

Vertical Alliance and Revenue Sharing of Chain-to-chain Competition Under Network Externality

作　　者：刘晓婧[1] 艾兴政[2] 唐小我[2] 

机构地区：[1]江苏师范大学商学院,江苏徐州221116 [2]电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川成都611731

出　　处：《预测》2016年第4期75-80,共6页Forecasting

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71372140)

摘　　要：基于网络外部性环境,本文构建了链与链数量竞争模型,识别了纵向联盟的形成机制,给出了供应链联盟中零售商收益共享比例的选择范围,分析了网络外部性强度系数和供应链数量竞争强度对收益共享比例范围的影响。研究表明:网络外部性强度较弱地影响竞争强度时,纵向联盟的收益共享合同能够实现零售商和供应商收益的改进;当网络外部性强度强烈地影响竞争强度时纵向联盟失效。Based on network externality environment, chain-to-chain quantity competition model is built, we identify the valid mechanism for vertical alliances formation and the alternative range of revenue sharing contracts, and also analyze the effect of product competition and network externality on the choice of alliances and revenue sharing contract. The results show that the vertical alliance contributes revenue improvement to both the manufacturer and the retailer when the effect of network externality on the quantity competition is not strong. However, vertical alliance will be out of operation when the effect of network externality on the quantity competition is strong.

关 键 词：网络外部性 链与链竞争 收益共享 纵向联盟 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]