基于多制造商竞合博弈的供应链契约  

Supply Chain Contracts Based on Competition-Cooperation Game in Multiple Manufacturers

作　　者：许丽霞[1,2] 徐琪[1] 刘续[1,2] 

机构地区：[1]东华大学旭日工商管理学院,上海200051 [2]宁夏大学教务处,宁夏银川750021

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2016年第4期67-73,共7页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71572033;71172174;71561023);上海市浦江人才计划基金资助项目(12PJC020);上海市社会科学规划基金资助项目(2013BGL014);宁夏大学自然科学基金资助项目(NDZR15028)

摘　　要：供应链竞合博弈下,考虑由两个制造商和一个占优零售商构成的供应链系统,研究竞合博弈下供应链批发价契约,以及合作博弈下进一步考虑单制造商和多制造商分别与零售商构成的供应链中达到供应链系统协调的收益共享契约,分析了产品竞争强度对合作和竞争关系的影响,以及供应链各方收益的分配。研究结果表明,竞合博弈下供应链批发价契约即使合作也不能达到供应链协调,合作博弈下单制造商与零售商基于收益共享的合作能达到供应链协调,而零售商与多制造商基于收益共享契约的合作,将随着产品竞争强度的增大而转为与单制造商合作,合作的达成和终止由零售商占主导决策。Based on competition-cooperation game,supply chain system models consisting of two competing manufacturers and one dominated retailer were proposed.Compared with wholesale price contract,the valid mechanism for competition-cooperation was investigated among manufacturers and the range of revenue sharing contract.The impact of product competition and the distribution of profits for all supply chain members were investigated.The results suggest that the wholesale price contract can not realize the supply chain coordination under competition-cooperation game,but the retailer and the manufacturers can achieve supply chain coordination based on cooperative game with the revenue sharing contract.The competition and cooperation are dependent on the intensity of product competition whereas independent of price risk.However,manufacturers and retailer based on revenue sharing contract cooperation,with the increase of product competition strength convert into noncooperation.The achievement and termination of cooperation are dominated by retailer.

关 键 词：多制造商 竞合关系 博弈分析 供应链契约 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]