基于政企博弈的电动汽车研发补贴政策研究  

Analysis on R&D Subsidy Policies Based on Bilateral Game between Government and Electric Vehicle Manufacturers

作　　者：秦字兴[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京信息科技大学机电工程学院,北京100192

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2016年第4期127-136,共10页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上资助项目(61272513)

摘　　要：构建了一个不完全信息条件下,电动汽车研发补贴动态博弈模型。基于边际成本定价准则,建立了政府研发补贴政策与企业研发投入之间的关系,分别从降低电动汽车的市场价格、提高企业研发投入比例以及改善政府与企业总收益的目标出发,计算局中人的最优策略并对相关影响因素进行了分析。数据表明,提高研发投入比例对降低电动汽车的市场价格具有决定性作用;在理想的政策环境下,存在唯一的补贴力度能够同时实现最优研发投入比例最大化以及最优市场价格最小化的目标,却无法同时令政府与企业的短期收益之和取得最大值;持续改善管制环境有利于提高管制效率,而侧重于鼓励技术成果转化及市场推广的政策更具效果。A dynamic game model with incomplete information was established to simulate R&D and subsidies between government and electric vehicles manufacturers.Based on marginal cost pricing rule,the relations between government R&D subsidy policies and enterprise R&D investment are quantified.Aiming at reducing the market price of electric vehicles,enlarging the portion of enterprises' R&D investment,and improving the total revenue of government and enterprises,optimum strategies were worked out,and potential factors counting for strategies' transition were analyzed.The results showed that increasing R&D investment plays a critical role in reducing market price of electric vehicles.Under the circumstance of ideal regulation environment,there is a certain subsidy quota for government to maximize the optimum R&D investment portion,to minimize the optimum market price,but rather to maximize the total revenue of both sides at the same time.It also indicated that sustainable improvement of regulation environment is contributive to raise subsidy polices' efficiency,and positive policies facilitating the commercialization of R&D results and electric vehicles' marketing are more effective.

关 键 词：研发补贴 不完全信息动态博弈 管制效率 电动汽车产业 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]