对相容性问题与自由意志关系的理解  

Relationships between the compatibility and free wills

作　　者：段素革[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津社会科学院伦理学研究所,天津300191

出　　处：《河北师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第4期119-124,共6页Journal of Hebei Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：决定论与自由意志、道德责任的相容性历来是伦理学领域探讨自由意志问题的一个重要方面。不相容论者认为,如果决定论为真,人就不可能具有自由意志;而相容论者则认为自由意志的存在不需要排除决定论。各种论点的建立都是围绕自由意志的概念进行的。"行为者有可供取舍的多种可能性"与"人是行为的终极源泉",是这个讨论中对于"自由"的两个主要的传统理解。当代相容论试图从人类行为的内在机制或社会性的角度来超越这两种对于自由的理解。The compatibility of determinism,free wills and moral obligations has remained a significant aspect in ethics.Those refuting compatibility believe that determinism cannot endow people with free wills,while those favoring compatibility claim that the existence of free wills does not rid of determinism.Actors are faced with diversified optional possibilities and human beings acting as ultimate source that have been two major traditional understandings of the freedom.The modern compatibility attempts to adopt the inner mechanisms of human actions or sociological properties.

关 键 词：自由意志 道德责任 决定论 相容性 相容论 

分 类 号：B82-02[哲学宗教—伦理学]