内外部人异质信念、控制权租金与企业融资决策  

Financing Decisions of Rent-seeking Controlling Shareholders under Disagreement between Insiders and Outsiders

作　　者：邓剑兰[1,2] 顾乃康[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学管理学院 [2]国信证券

出　　处：《金融评论》2016年第4期47-63,125,共17页Chinese Review of Financial Studies

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"市场折(溢)价与企业资本结构的决定及动态性研究"(批准号71272203)的支持

摘　　要：本文在存在内外部人异质信念的假定下，基于随机过程以及实物期权等方法，构建了内生化控制权租金以及权益或债务市场时机等因素的控制大股东最优融资决策模型，并在使用数值模拟方法对模型进行具体量化的基础上提出了本文的实证研究假设。我们进一步使用我国上市公司2004~2013年的样本数据进行实证检验。研究发现。权益融资相较于债务融资对内外部人异质信念下的市场时机更为敏感，企业的融资决策主要是受到内外部人异质信念下权益市场时机的影响；当外部人相对内部人乐观程度较高时．我国上市公司的控制大股东存在抓住市场时机的机会主义行为。表现为在外部融资中倾向于选择权益融资的方式。更为重要的是。控制大股东攫取控制权租金的行为能够抑制控制大股东在内外部人异质信念下通过过度权益融资抓住有利市场时机的倾向。Based on the assumption that controlling shareholders are rent-seeking, this article constructs a model of controlling shareholders' optimal financing decision under insiders-outsiders heterogeneous beliefs. It also uses the data of Chinese listed firms during 2004-2013 to test the conclusions given by the numerical simulation with this model. The main findings are as follows. Firstly, compared to debt, equity is more sensitive to market timing induced by insiders-outsiders heterogeneous beliefs, so corporate financing decisions are mainly influenced by market timing of equity. Secondly, when the outside investors are more optimistic than insiders, there will be 'opportunistic behavior of market timing' in Chinese enterprises; that is, Chinese enterprises tend to increase equity financing. Thirdly, higher private benefits of controlling shareholders can suppress controlling shareholders' tendency to time the market by over equity financing.

关 键 词：异质信念 控制权租金 融资决策 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学]