半强制分红政策影响了再融资企业的盈余管理吗?  

Does Semi-mandatory Dividend Policy Affect the Earnings Management of Refinancing Companies?

作　　者：戴志敏[1] 楼杰云 

机构地区：[1]浙江大学经济学院,浙江杭州310027

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2016年第9期9-18,185,共10页East China Economic Management

基　　金：浙江省科技厅重点软科学研究项目(2012C25077)

摘　　要：半强制分红政策首先影响上市公司分红政策,进而影响盈余管理行为。文章以2008年颁布的《关于修改上市公司现金分红若干规定的决定》为政策背景,研究了现金分红门槛对再融资企业盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现:"优质企业"为了降低现金分红水平,传递企业质量信号,更有可能进行负向盈余管理;相反,"普通企业"只能进行正向盈余管理迎合业绩门槛,但是并没有增加现金分红水平。进一步分析发现,市场并不排斥再融资前的负向盈余管理行为,但是对正向盈余管理较为抵触。研究得到的启示是:一方面,半强制分红政策影响了"优质企业"的盈余管理动机,产生了现金分红的负向激励;另一方面,导致"普通企业"迎合行为更加困难。The semi-mandatory dividend policy firstly affects listed companies＇ dividend policies,and then affects their earningsmanagement behavior. This paper sets the＂Decisions on Amending Some Provisions on Cash Dividends by Listed Companies＂released in 2008 as the policy background,and researches the influence of cash dividend threshold on the refinancing companies＇ earnings management behavior. The research finds that＂the high-quality refinancing companies＂tend to carry out negative earningsmanagement to reduce the payment level of cash dividends and signal quality. However,the＂ordinary-quality refinancingcompanies＂have to cater to the earnings threshold by positive earnings management without increasing cash dividends payment.Furthermore,investors prefer negative earnings management to positive earnings management. The implications are that the semi-mandatory dividend policy effectively,on the one hand,affects the high-quality companies＇ motivation of earnings management,and generates the passive encourage for its dividends payment;on the other hand,the decisions make the ordinary-quality companiesharder to cater to the policy than before.

关 键 词：半强制分红政策 再融资 现金分红 盈余管理 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]