政府创新补贴对零售商双渠道供应链的影响研究  

Research on the Effect of Government Innovation Subsidy on Retailer's Dual Channel Supply Chain

作　　者：单汨源[1] 刘超[1] 刘小红[1] 

机构地区：[1]湖南大学工商管理学院,长沙410082

出　　处：《华东经济管理》2016年第9期120-124,共5页East China Economic Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(70971036);国家社会科学基金后期资助项目(13FGL005)

摘　　要：随着互联网的迅速发展,零售商日益盛行开辟网络销售渠道,零售商双渠道供应链成为一种趋势。文章在政府创新补贴研究基础上构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的零售商双渠道斯塔克伯格博弈模型,研究政府创新补贴对供应链的影响。研究结果表明:政府创新补贴能有效激励制造商进行创新,增加政府创新补贴能拉动供应链整体利润的增长;通过算例对研究问题进行了深入探讨,并给出了政府效用最大化时政府应该设置的创新补贴激励系数。研究结论可为政府制定合理决策提供理论依据和有效参考。With the robust development of Internet,online sales has become the new fashion which together with retailer,this dualchannel sailing model has been a kind of trend. In this paper,a stackelberg game model of dual supply by manufacturer and retailerwas generated on the basis of reasearch on goverment inovation subsidy. We aimed at discussing the effect of government inovationsubsidy on supply chain.Our observation showed that：the government innovation subsidies can effectively motivate the manufacturer＇screativity. And increasing the subsidies can promote the growth of the benifits of the whole supply chain. Finally,a numericalexample was given to thoroughly discuss the research questions and a optimized coefficient of government inovation subsidy wasgiven to help the government to make a more reasonable decision as a theoretical basis and practical reference.

关 键 词：零售商双渠道 斯塔克伯格博弈 政府创新补贴 供应链 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]