道德风险模型中代理人公平敏感性对契约影响  

Impact caused by agents' equity sensitivity in the moral risk model

作　　者：王先甲[1,2] 张柳波[1] 关旭[1] 肖露[1] 钱桂生[3] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072 [2]武汉大学系统工程研究所,武汉430072 [3]香港城市大学系统工程与工程管理系

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第8期21-31,共11页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71231007;71373222)

摘　　要：在传统的道德风险模型中引入公平偏好同时糅合公平敏感性,通过公平敏感性系数刻画代理人对公平理解的差异性.以这类引入了代理人公平偏好及公平敏感性系数的委托代理模型,研究委托代理契约的设计方法并分析公平敏感性对契约结构及代理人最优努力水平的影响.研究表明:完全信息下委托人设计的契约只需支付与公平敏感性系数正相关的固定支付;在努力水平不可观察时,当公平敏感性系数大到一定程度时,委托人会通过调节固定支付消除不公平的存在;而当公平敏感性系数也不可观察时,委托人则根据期望公平敏感系数做决策.The paper introduced equity sensitivity into the moral risk model with fairness preference, which can depict the diversity of fair understanding for agents, to analyze how equity sensitivity affects the contract structure and the optimal effort level of agents. The results with given parameters show that： the principal will pay a fixed payment correlated with the fair sensitivity coefficient with complete information; when agents＇ effort level cannot be observed by the principal, the principal will eliminate unfairness by adjusting the fixed payment for agents with a certain equity sensitivity coefficient; when the sensitivity coefficient is also not observed, the principal makes decision according to expected equity sensitive coefficient.

关 键 词：契约 道德风险 激励机制 公平敏感性 公平偏好 

分 类 号：F019[经济管理—政治经济学]