终极控制股东所有权和控制权分离度、外部治理和融资结构——基于中小板上市公司的数据检验  

The Ultimate Controlling Shareholders' Ownership-Control Rights Divergence,External Governance and Capital Structure

作　　者：侯丽[1] 钟田丽[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北大学工商管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2016年第8期107-110,共4页Communication of Finance and Accounting

基　　金：国家自然基金项目(项目编号:71150002);教育部高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金项目(项目编号:20090042110033)资助

摘　　要：本文以2005-2013年中小板上市公司为样本数据,实证检验了终极控制股东所有权和控制权分离度与债务融资之间的负相关关系;并实证研究了终极控制股东所有权和控制权分离度与公司外部治理机制的交互作用对债务融资的影响。结果发现:信息披露质量越高越能减弱终极控制股东所有权和控制权分离度与债务融资之间的负相关关系,抑制其规避债务融资的行为;较高的机构投资者持股比例却加重了终极控制股东所有权和控制权分离度与债务融资之间负相关的关系,增强其规避债务融资的行为;产品市场竞争强度对终极控制股东规避债务融资的抑制作用不明显。Based on the data of small and medium-sized listing corporation from 2005-2013,this paper firstly examines The ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership-control rights divergence has a significant negative impact on the firm's reliance on debt financing;then the competition in product market.institutional ownership and the quality of information disclosure as moderator were introduced into this research.They were used to study the impact of external governance between The ultimate controlling shareholders' ownership-control rights divergence and capital structure.The empirical results indicate that firms controlled by large shareholders with excess control rights may choose debt financing as a way of avoiding scrutiny and insulating themselves from creditor monitoring.These effects are particularly pronounced for firms with high institutional ownership and are weakened by the high quality of information disclosure.These effects are not weakened by the fierce competition in product market.

关 键 词：终极控制股东 所有权和控制权分离度 外部治理 融资结构 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F271[经济管理—国民经济]