中国银行业的系统性风险研究——从隐性担保到优胜劣汰  

Research on the Banking Systemic Risk in China:From Implicit Guarantee to the Survival of the Fittest

作　　者：陆军[1] 林澍[1] 

机构地区：[1]中山大学岭南学院

出　　处：《南方经济》2016年第8期12-23,共12页South China Journal of Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(编号71273287)资助

摘　　要：文章通过构建一个同时涵盖银行间同业拆借市场与回购市场的矩阵法模型,对2006-2014年我国银行业系统性风险进行研究,主要考虑隐性担保与优胜劣汰机制对系统性风险的影响。研究发现,总体上我国银行业系统性风险在近年来稳定在低位,从隐性担保转变到优胜劣汰并不会大幅提高我国银行业的系统性风险水平,优胜劣汰机制有可能增强市场纪律性,从而降低其系统性风险。We constructed a new matrix model,w hich was consist of the interbank market and the repo market,to study the banking systemic risk in China from 2006 to 2014. Specially,w e explicitly considered the influence of changing from implicit guarantee to the survival of the fittest. We found that in recent years,the banking systemic risk stayed low and the change wouldn ＇t threaten the goodness of the banking system. Instead,the change might strengthen the market discipline and low er the banking systemic risk.

关 键 词：隐性担保 市场纪律性 系统性风险 回购市场 矩阵法 

分 类 号：F82[经济管理—财政学]