董事会治理、盈余管理与费用粘性  

Board Governance, Earning Management and Expense Stickiness

作　　者：刘嫦[1] 郭颖颖[1] 李丽丹[1] 

机构地区：[1]石河子大学经济与管理学院

出　　处：《中国注册会计师》2016年第9期41-47,3,共8页The Chinese Certified Public Accountant

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究新疆项目"地方政府政绩考核对会计稳健性影响研究"(12XJJA79000211);新疆自治区普通高等学校人文社科重点研究基地公司治理与管理创新研究中心项目(专项委托)"兵团现代财政制度构建研究"(XJEDU020114B01);新疆自治区研究生科研创新项目"宏观经济不确定性;多元化与财务柔性"(XJGRI 2015046)的资助

摘　　要：本文以2007—2012年我国A股上市公司年度数据为样本系统考察了董事会治理和盈余管理对企业费用粘性的影响。经验证据表明:公司应计盈余管理显著弱化了企业的费用粘性;良好的董事会治理机制则有助于遏制管理层基于盈余管理目的的成本管理行为,进而提高了企业的费用粘性;进一步研究表明,企业的费用粘性仅仅体现在国有企业中,且相对于民营企业,国有企业基于自身的增长目标和政治目标通过操控费用支出对企业费用粘性的影响更为凸显;企业相对于同行业竞争对手的盈利增长压力强化了企业应计盈余管理行为下的费用粘性。Based on the annual financial data of A-share listed companies in 2007-2012, this article systematically studies the influence of board governance and earning management on expense stickiness. The empirical evidence shows that the accruals earning management significantly weakens the expense stickiness; while sound board governance mechanisms are conducive to curbing the cost management behaviors of the management for the purpose of earnings management and accordingly, improving expense stickiness. Further research shows that, expense stickiness only occurs in SOEs; moreover, compared to private owned enterprises, SOEs has stronger willingness to manipulate their expenditure because of their growth targets and political targets, and have a prominent influence on expense stickiness. With the pressure of earning growth from their competitors in the same industry, enterprises strengthen their expense stickiness under accruals earnings management behaviors.

关 键 词：董事会治理 盈余管理 企业费用 粘性 A股上市公司 经验证据 管理行为 管理目的 

分 类 号：F271[经济管理—企业管理] F275[经济管理—国民经济]