熊彼特竞争,交叉效应与创新激励  

Schumpeter competition,cross-effects,and innovation incentives

作　　者：蒋军锋[1,2] 王茜[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,西安710054 [2]解放军博士后管理信息中心,南京210002

出　　处：《管理科学学报》2016年第9期79-93,共15页Journal of Management Sciences in China

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172200;71672143;71402137);教育部人文社会科学一般资助项目(16YJA630020);陕西省软科学研究计划资助项目(2016KRM033);陕西省自然科学基础研究计划资助项目(2015JM7375);陕西省重点学科建设专项资金资助项目(107-00X901);西安理工大学青年社会科学学术创新团队资助项目(105-451215007)

摘　　要：论文引入行业熊彼特竞争,基于技术原创性与市场原创性,纳入技术与市场专业人员努力的交叉效应,研究创新激励合约的时间长度、激励实现的组织形式与创新团队剩余索取权分成系数的选择.研究显示:1)当不存在委托代理问题时,技术与市场专业人员的整合总是创新团队组织的优化选择;2)创新团队的组织形式对企业创新对象的复杂性选择与剩余索取权分配不产生影响;3)行业熊彼特竞争强度、创新原创性与创新激励合约时间长度负相关;4)交叉效应与技术和市场原创性3者的关系决定了最优创新激励的组织形式.研究提高了创新团队管理的可操作性,强化了创新激励对行业竞争的响应性.Introducing Schumpeter competition in cal and market professional efforts into our model, industry （SCII） and the crossing effect between technologi- the paper studies the simultaneous optimization of the con- tract duration （ complexity of innovation）, organizational form and residual claims in order to motivate innova- tion. The paper finds that integration of technology and market professionals is a prioritized organizational form to motivate teams in the absence of principal-agent problems, and that organizational forms of teams could not exert any impact on either contract duration or residual claims. The study also finds that both the SCII and the originality of innovation are negatively correlated with the contract duration, and that the organizational form ofteams is dependent on the relationship among the crossing effect, technological originality, and market origi- nality. This study improves the actual operability with reference to innovation incentives and strengthens the response to industrial competition.

关 键 词：技术-市场原创性 交叉效应 创新复杂性 激励刚性 激励扭曲 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理] F243.2[经济管理—国民经济]