基于经济博弈模型的酒类防伪问题研究  

Wine Anti-counterfeiting Issues Based on Economic Game Theory Model

作　　者：苑春荟[1] 王晨[1] 李晓龙[1] 

机构地区：[1]北京邮电大学经济管理学院,北京100876

出　　处：《北京邮电大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第3期58-64,共7页Journal of Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications(Social Sciences Edition)

基　　金：国家科技支撑计划项目(2014BAH23F07)

摘　　要：面对酒类行业制假问题的频发,品牌酒厂需要从经济本质探寻有效防伪的方法。采用混合策略博弈和不完全信息动态博弈的方法研究品牌酒厂、制假者和消费者之间的经济利益关系,解释了采取规模化防伪措施的必要性,提出防伪程度的界定标准,认为采取防伪行动利于减少信息的不对称。并进一步估算出在保证品牌酒厂收益最大的前提下,防伪投入成本的最优值,为品牌酒厂提供合理的方向指导,为监管部门提供政策建议。In the face of the problems of frequent fraud in wine industry, brand wineries have taken anti-counterfeiting measures to cope with the economic and brand loss caused by adulterated wine. The economic relationships among the brand wineries, counterfeiters and consumers are analyzed in mixed strategy game and incomplete information dynamic game theory to explain the necessity of taking anti-counterfeiting operations and to propose the defined standards of anti-counterfeiting level. What＇ s more, the related factors affecting consumer purchase are clarified, which is beneficial to reducing information asymmetry. Then, in the premise of ensuring the maximum earnings of the brand wineries, the optimal value of the anti-counterfeiting investment cost is estimated so as to provide reasonable guidance for brand wineries and policy recommendations for regulatory authorities to promote the establishment of a sound regulatory system and a whole virtuous circle for the wine market.

关 键 词：酒类防伪 规模化防伪 防伪程度 最优成本投入 博弈论 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] TS26[轻工技术与工程—发酵工程]