生命主体、固有价值、平等主义与物种主义——汤姆·雷根的动物权利理论批判  

Subject- of- a- Life,Inherent Values,Egalitarianism and Speciesism——Criticism of the Theory of Tom Regan's Animal Rights

作　　者：王鹏伟[1,2] 董国安[1] 

机构地区：[1]华南师范大学公共管理学院,广东广州510006 [2]广东医科大学马克思主义学院,广东湛江524023

出　　处：《自然辩证法研究》2016年第10期62-66,共5页Studies in Dialectics of Nature

摘　　要：在雷根的动物权利理论中,作为形式化正义原则基础的固有价值假定的内涵实际上就是生命主体标准。雷根对动物生命主体的证成是成功的。但以此为由,基于跨物种的平等原则而主张动物拥有道德地位和道德权利却是不合理的。人类拥有权利不是因为他们具备固有价值,而在于他们是人。物种主义是适宜的。In the theory of Tom Began＇ s animal rights, the connotation of the assumption of inherent values, as the basis of the formal principle of justice, is subject - of - a - life criterion. Began＇ s proof that animals are subjects - of - a - life is reasonable, but, on this ground, it is improper to claim that animals have moral status and moral rights based on the egalitarianism of across species. The reason that human beings have rights is not that they have in- herent values, but that they are human beings. Speciesism is proper.

关 键 词：生命主体 固有价值 内在价值 平等主义 物种主义 汤姆·雷根 动物权利 

分 类 号：N031[自然科学总论—科学技术哲学]