盈余管理、内部人交易回报及证券分析师的作用  

Earnings Management,Insider Trading Returns,and the Role of Securities Analysts

作　　者：储小俊[1] 刘喆[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京信息工程大学,南京210044

出　　处：《阅江学刊》2016年第5期55-66,共12页Yuejiang Academic Journal

基　　金：中国博士后基金项目"考虑投资者情绪的内部人交易理论模型与实证研究"(2015M571546);国家社会科学基金项目"基于操作工具视角的货币政策与宏观审慎政策协调研究"(13BJY165)

摘　　要：内部人和外部投资者之间的信息不对称使内部人交易可以获得超常回报,盈余管理是导致信息不对称的重要原因。实证研究结果表明,内部人交易回报与可操控性应计利润正相关,市场信息环境能够对二者的关系产生影响。作为外部治理机制的组成部分,证券分析师在一定程度上可以改善股票交易的信息环境,跟踪某公司证券分析师人数的增加、预测离散度的降低,都意味着股票交易处于相对更好的信息环境中。信息环境的改善可以提高股票价格的信息含量,抑制可操控性应计利润对内部人交易回报的影响。因此,无需严格禁止内部人交易,重要的是改善信息环境,发展高质量的证券分析师队伍,监管内部人交易,加强对上市公司信息披露的监管,从而降低内部人与外部投资者的信息不对称,降低非法内幕交易的可能性。Information asymmetry between internal and external investors can make insider trader get extra returns. Earnings management is an important reason for asymmetric information. Empirical results show that insider trading returns are positively correlated with discretionary accrual and the environment of market can affect the relationship between the internal and external investors. As an external governance mechanism,analysts can improve stock trading information environment,track the population of analysts and predict the decrease of dispersion. It is equivalent to putting exchange of stocks in a sound environment. The improvement of information environment can improve the information content of stock price and restrain the influence of operating profit on insider trading. Therefore,there is no need to strictly prohibit insider trading. The most important is that a better information environment is needed to develop a team of securities analysts with high quality. Insider trading needs regulation to strengthen supervision of information disclosure of listed companies, so as to reduce the information asymmetry of the interior and the exterior investors and reduce the possibility of illegal Insider trading.

关 键 词：盈余管理 内部人交易 证券分析师 可操控性应计利润 信息环境 

分 类 号：F832.51[经济管理—金融学] F275