企业并购中政府干预的动机与效果:综述与启示  

Motivation and Effect of Government Intervention in Enterprise Merger and Acquisition: An Integrative Review

作　　者：杨沁[1] 扈文秀[1] 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《预测》2016年第5期74-80,共7页Forecasting

基　　金：高等学校博士点基金资助项目(20096118110010)

摘　　要：在政府干预企业并购动因与效果的研究中,现有文献主要集中在两个方面:一是政府规制理论,从政府政策、法规制定的外部宏观视角出发,历经公共利益理论、利益集团理论,发展到目前的激励规制理论,强调政府公共利益动机与集团利益动机并存。二是政府终极控制权理论,从公司治理的微观视角出发,将政府干预行为视为企业并购决策的内生变量,认为政府的"掠夺"之手与"支持"之手共生。两大理论体系研究视角各不相同,彼此独立成型但缺少关联性。探讨政府控股对企业并购产生影响的路径与机理,构建合意的地方政府的激励性规制及企业的经济性规制体系是未来研究的方向。Current studies on motivation and effect of government intervention in M＆A mainly focus on two aspects. The first aspect is the government regulation theory, which study government intervention motivation from the macro perspec- tive of the government policies, laws and regulations. It develops from the public interest theory to the interest group theory, and finally to the present incentive regulation theory. This incentive regulation theory emphasizes the organic combination of the public interest motivation and self-interest motivation which related to government intervention. The second aspect is the ultimate ownership theory, which study behavior and manner of government intervention related to the micro viewpoint in corporate governance, and it considers the government intervention as endogenous variable of M＆A decision. It emphasizes the coexistence of the ＂tunnel＂ hand and ＂support＂ hand in government intervention. The research perspectives and theoretical framework of these two theories are different from each other, but they ｜ack relevance and systematic. The methods and mechanisms that government ownership affect the M＆A decisions, the construction of local government incentive regulation system and suitable system of economic regulation are all future research directions.

关 键 词：企业并购 政府干预 规制理论 终极控股权 

分 类 号：F270[经济管理—企业管理]