机构投资者对信息披露的治理效应--基于机构调研行为的证据  

The Governance Role of Institutional Investors in Information Disclosure:Evidence from Institutional Investors' Corporate Visits

作　　者：谭劲松[1,2] 林雨晨[2] Tan Jinsong Lin Yuchen(Center for Accounting, Finance and Institutions, Sun Yat-sen University Sun Yat-sen Business School, Sun Yat-sen University)

机构地区：[1]中山大学现代会计与财务研究中心 [2]中山大学管理学院

出　　处：《南开管理评论》2016年第5期115-126,138,共13页Nankai Business Review

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71272196);广东省人文社科重点研究基地重大项目(2012JDXM-0002)资助

摘　　要：机构投资者既是资本市场中重要的参与者,也是完善公司治理机制的重要主体。现有研究着重于机构投资者持股及其后果,对机构投资者的治理行为和机制缺乏深入探讨。本文从理论上对机构投资者的积极行为进行了分析,认为机构投资者有助于通过改善公司治理水平从而提升公司的信息披露质量,并构建了机构治理影响信息披露质量的理论模型,通过理论模型的推导和实证数据的检验,证明了机构投资者的积极治理效应,发现机构投资者调研行为是其参与治理的方式之一。As an important participant in capital market, institutional investors play a principle role in improving corporate governance. Most existing studies have focused on institutional ownership and its economic consequences. Nevertheless, they have not provided sufficient insight on the governance behavior of institutional investors as well as the underlying incentive mechanism. This paper proposes a novel theory to analyze the institutional investors＇ behavior of active governance, and it shows that such behavior significantly improves the quality of corporate information disclosure. Consistent with our theoretical prediction, our empirical analysis finds strong evidence on the positive governance effect by institutional investors, whose primary approach for involvement in corporate governance is to conduct regular corporate visits. Using the hand-collected data of institutional investors＇ corporate visits during 2009-2014 in ChiNext, we find that the firms visited by institutional investors are more likely to have a greater tendency of disclosing more information than the firms that have never been visited. In particular, a higher frequency of visits or a larger number of participating institutional investors may lead to a higher degree of disclosure. Consistent with the notion that on-site visits endow institutional investors with more frequent and active interaction with the firms, we find that the results are stronger for firms which are visited on site, when compared with other visit forms such as telephone visits, internet meetings and media credentials etc. In addition, we find that the effect of a site visit is greater when the site visit is conducted by securities companies or funds, rather than insurance companies or QFIIs. We also control for the impact of SOEs, shareholders, board members, firm size, debt, profitability, growth opportunities, auditor opinion and industry on corporate disclosure. Finally, tests of the direction of causality suggest that visits conducted by institutional investors lead

关 键 词：机构投资者 公司治理 信息披露 上市公司调研 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]