盈余质量、外部监督与股价崩盘风险——来自中国上市公司的经验证据  

Surplus Quality,External Monitoring and the Risk of Stock Price Crash:Empirical Evidence on Chinese Listed Corporations

作　　者：杨棉之[1] 刘洋[1] YANG MianZhi LIU Yang(School of Business, Anhui University, Hefei 230601)

机构地区：[1]安徽大学商学院,安徽合肥230601

出　　处：《财贸研究》2016年第5期147-156,共10页Finance and Trade Research

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目"会计信息质量对股价崩盘风险的影响机理及经济后果研究"(71472002);教育部人文社会科学研究规划项目"股权激励在企业资本配置中的作用机理与效果研究"(14YJA630082)

摘　　要：以中国2008—2012年A股主板上市公司为研究样本,实证检验盈余质量对股价崩盘风险的影响,以及外部监督对两者关系的调节作用。研究发现,盈余质量与股价崩盘风险显著负相关。进一步的分析表明,考虑外部监督因素,证券分析师跟踪及机构投资者持股作为公司外部监督力量,均能缓解信息不对称,抑制公司管理层盈余管理行为,使得盈余质量与股价崩盘风险间的负向相关关系减弱,但证券分析师的外部监督作用仅在没有乐观预期的前提下存在。Taking China＇s 2008- 2012 A share main board listed companies as research samples,this paper empirically tests the impact of surplus quality on the stock price crash risk,and the influence on the relationship between the improvement in external monitoring. The results showthat surplus quality and stock price crash risk is significantly negative correlated. Further considering external monitoring factors shows that securities analysts tracking and institutional investors holding company as external monitoring power can alleviate the information asymmetry,inhibit the company ＇s management makes surplus quality,decrease the negative correlation between the earnings management behavior and stock price crash risk,but the external supervision of securities analyst role only exists on the premise of no optimism.

关 键 词：盈余质量 外部监督 股价崩盘风险 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]