不完全信息下房地产价格的演化博弈分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of the Price of Real Estate under Incomplete Information

作　　者：罗桂美[1] LUO Gui-mei(Department of Applied Mathematics, Guangdong University of Finance, Guangzhou, 510521, China)

机构地区：[1]广东金融学院应用数学系,广东广州510521

出　　处：《数学的实践与认识》2016年第20期54-61,共8页Mathematics in Practice and Theory

基　　金：教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金(15YJA790043);广东高校优秀青年创新人才培养计划项目(2013LYM_0060);2014年度广东金融学院创新强校建设项目"数学建模教学团队"资助

摘　　要：基于PAB(Pay-As-Bid)竞价机制,探讨不完全信息情况下供需关系对房屋成交价格的影响.在购房者对房屋价格预期不确定和购房者有限理性的假设下,利用鲁棒优化技术和演化博弈论中的"复制动态"思想,提出鲁棒演化博弈均衡的概念,建立相应的复制动态系统,并对系统的鲁棒演化均衡的渐进稳定性进行分析,得到在不同市场供需情况下购房者价格策略演化的一般规律.最后选用数值算例对模型加以验证.Based on PAB（Pay-As-Bid） bidding mechanism,we study the relationship between supply and demand of the impact on housing prices under incomplete information.When the buyers are both bounded rational and axe not sure of the expectations for housing prices,a concept of robust evolutionary equilibrium is proposed.By using evolutionary game theory of ＂dynamic replication＂,we establish the corresponding dynamic replication system and analyze the asymptotic stability for the robust evolutionary stable strategy of this system.Then we obtain a general rule of price strategy evolution in different market supply and demand situations.Finally,we present a numerical example to illustrate the model.

关 键 词：不完全信息 房地产价格 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F224.32[经济管理—国民经济] F299.23