再制造补贴下闭环供应链协调的最优价格激励方式  

The Optimal Price Incentives Contract of the Remanufacturing Closed-loop Supply Chain Coordination with the Government Subsidy

作　　者：张汉江[1,2] 余华英[1,2] 甘兴 ZHANG Han-jiang YU Hua-ying GAN Xing(School of Economics and Trade, H unan University, Changsha 410079, China Key Laboratory of Logistics Information ＆ Simulation Technology in Hunan,Changsha 410079,China)

机构地区：[1]湖南大学经济与贸易学院,湖南长沙410079 [2]湖南省物流信息与仿真技术重点实验室,湖南长沙410079

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第8期123-128,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71420107027);湖南省社科基金课题(2012YBA070)

摘　　要：回收再制造可以节省资源利用和保护环境,具有正向的外部经济性,市场失灵导致政府公共政策的介入,回收再制造作为实现循环经济的一种重要的方式已经引起了社会的广泛关注。根据信息经济学中的最优激励理论为基础,考虑政府财政补贴企业再制造废旧产品以鼓励企业从事回收再制造活动,讨论了只生产新产品的企业通过它的零售商销售产品,和生产新产品的同时使用从独立的第三方回收商处回收的废旧产品生产再制造产品的企业通过它的零售商销售产品的竞争闭环供应链中,优化设计了以回收商的回收价格作为激励对象的激励契约,实现废旧产品回收与销售过程的闭环供应链协调。通过对求得的均衡结果分析发现,最优回收价格激励契约可以实现废旧产品回收销售的闭环供应链协调。Recycle and remanufacturing can save resources and protect the environment, which is positive to the external economy. Meanwhile the market failure will lead to the government＇s intervention. Recycle and remanufacturingas a kind of important way of realizing recycling economy has caused the wide attention of the society. According to the optimal incentive theory in Information Economics, it is considered that the government provide fiscal subsidies to enterprise to encourage enterprises to engage in activities of recycling waste product, and it is discussed that in the competitive closed supply chain of the enterprise producing new products and selling them only through its retailers, and the enterprise producing new products and at the same time producing the remanufaetured products from the waste products purchased from the independent third-party recycler and selling them by its retailers, a incentive contract is designed in which the recycle price of the recycler is the incentive object, which realizes closed-loop supply chain coordination （CLSC） of the waste products recycling process and products selling process. Based on the analysis results of equilibrium, it can be concluded that the optimal price incentive contractcan realize CLSC.

关 键 词：物流与供应链管理 最优价格激励契约 博弈论 政府补贴再制造 供应链协调 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]