在线渠道折扣促销下的双渠道供应链合作广告协调研究  

Coordination Model for Cooperative Advertising in Dual-Channel Supply Chain When Online Channel Implements Discount Promotion

作　　者：陈国鹏[1,2] 张旭梅[1,2] 肖剑[3] 

机构地区：[1]重庆大学经济与工商管理学院,重庆400044 [2]重庆大学现代物流重庆市重点实验室,重庆400030 [3]重庆大学数学与统计学院,重庆401331

出　　处：《管理工程学报》2016年第4期203-209,共7页Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71172084;71572020)

摘　　要：针对制造商在线渠道与传统零售渠道同时存在价格和广告竞争下的合作广告问题,建立双渠道供应链的价格折扣和广告需求模型,分别求出了集中决策和Stackelberg主从博弈下的均衡广告投入和广告分担比例,分析了价格折扣变化对合作广告决策的影响,并探讨了渠道市场结构影响下的最优价格折扣水平。研究结果表明,价格折扣的提高将降低零售商广告投入的积极性;当价格折扣水平小于某一临界值,随着价格折扣的加大,制造商将提高在线渠道的折扣促销广告投入。通过对比集中决策和Stackelberg主从博弈下均衡的广告投入和价格折扣水平,在制造商分担部分传统零售商促销广告投入的基础上,设计一个在线渠道收益共享协调契约,可实现供应链系统协调。With the rapid development of Intemet technology and e-commerea, most manufacturers that sell products only through traditional retailers have begun to sell products by building their own online channels. In order to improve online market share and obtain more profit, the manufacturer usually implements price discount strategy in its online channel, which will attract some price sensitive consumers of traditional channels. With the decrease of the demand for traditional channels, the retailer will be dissatisfied with price discount and channel conflict will aggravate. Cooperative advertising is a prevalent means in the current marketing practice to alleviate channel conflict and coordinate the supply chain system. The manufacturer shares the advertising cost of the traditional retailer through cooperative advertising strategy, which can reduce the dissatisfaction of the traditional retailer on the manufacturer＇s price discount strategy. In order to implement reasonable price deduction and cooperative advertising decisions in dual-channel supply chain, it is necessary to disclose the relationship between price deduction and cooperative advertising strategies, and coordinate the dual-channel supply chain. This paper focuses on the cooperative advertising in a dual-channel supply chain where price competition and advertising competition exist simultaneously between manufacturer＇s online channel and retailer＇s traditional channel. By establishing a product demand model with cooperative advertising and price deduction, we obtain the optimal manufacturer＇s advertising investment, optimal retailer＇ advertising investment, and manufacturer＇s advertising participation ratio in two different game scenarios： Stackelberg game and cooperative game. We analyze the impact of price deduction on cooperative advertising decisions, and discuss the effect of channel structare on price deduction strategy. The results show that manufacturers will increase their promotion advertising investment as the market share of t

关 键 词：双渠道供应链 合作广告 价格折扣 STACKELBERG博弈 

分 类 号：F273[经济管理—企业管理]