产业政策、政治关联与民营企业投资  

Industrial Policy,Political Connection and Investment of Private Enterprises

作　　者：唐建新[1] 罗文涛[1] 

机构地区：[1]武汉大学经济与管理学院,武汉430072

出　　处：《商业研究》2016年第11期33-40,共8页Commercial Research

摘　　要：本文以"十一五规划"和"十二五规划"为研究背景,实证检验了正式制度-产业政策和非正式制度-政治关联对于民营企业投资的影响,发现:产业政策虽然促进了民营企业的投资水平,但降低了民营企业的投资效率;政治关联与产业政策在民营企业投资水平方面存在一定的替代作用,在投资效率上存在互补作用,并且互补作用只体现在改善了民营企业的投资不足,深化了政治关联的资源效应;另外,拥有政治关联的民营企业的确能够提前获取产业政策的相关信息,更早地进行投资丰富了政治关联的信息效应。Based on the underground of ＂11th Five-Year Plan＂ and ＂12th Five-Year Plan＂, this paper empirically tests the effects of formal institution-industrial policy and informal institution-political connection on the investment of private enterprises, finding that industrial policy promotes the level of private enterprises＇ investment, but it reduces private enterprises＇ investment efficiency; political connection and industrial policy have a substitution effect on the level of private enterprises＇ investment and have a complementary effect on the investment efficiency, which only reflects in improving the insufficient investment of private enterprises, and deepens the resources effects of political connection; in addition, those private enterprises with political connection can get relevant information before the ＂Five-Year plan＂, which leads to earlier investment, proving the information effects of political connection.

关 键 词：产业政策 政治关联 民营企业投资 信息效应 资源效应 

分 类 号：F276[经济管理—企业管理]