长期视角下股权激励的动态效应研究  

A RESEARCH ON THE DYNAMIC EFFECT OF EQUITY INCENTIVE UNDER A LONG-TERM TIME FRAME

作　　者：陈文强[1] CHEN Wen-qiang(School of Management, Zhejiang Universit)

机构地区：[1]浙江大学管理学院,邮政编码310058

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2016年第11期53-66,共14页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金面上项目(71372059)的资助

摘　　要：基于长期研究视角,本文在考察股权激励对企业绩效动态影响的基础上,检验了产权性质、授予动机和实施频率对这一关系的影响。结果显示:股权激励存在动态激励效应。不仅在实施当期具有即期影响,在实施后的五年还表现出持续性的激励效果,且在时间分布上呈现出先升后降的"倒U型"特征。相较于民营企业,国有企业实施股权激励后的绩效提升作用较弱,持续期较短,且在实施初期没有即刻显现出激励效应,而是经历了一个为期两年的滞后期。相较于绩效提升作用更强、更持久的激励型契约,福利型合约仅在短期内存在激励效果,并在实施后第四年出现业绩反转,显现出负效应。相对于只实施了一期的公司,股权激励对连续实施多期激励计划公司的激励效果更好,不仅绩效提升作用更强,激励效应也更持久、稳定。This paper investigates the dynamic effect of equity incentive on operating performance un- der a long-term time frame, and examines whether and how this dynamic relationship between equity in- centive and corporate operating performance can be moderated by property rights, grant motivation and implementation frequency. The results show as follows. Equity incentive can not only exert current incen- tive effect in the event year, but also exist persistent effect in the following 5 years, which presents an in- verted u-shaped dynamic characteristic. Compared with private enterprises, the incentive effect of state- owned enterprises exists a two-year time lagged effect and can only last for 3years. Compared to incentive contracts with more stable and continuous incentive, welfare contracts exist only short-term incentive effect and appear negative effects after the third year. Equity incentive has stronger and more lasting per- formance-improving effect for the enterprises with higher frequency of implementation.

关 键 词：股权激励 动态效应 产权性质 授予动机 实施频率 倾向得分匹配法 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理]