尊严诸观念及其法治意蕴  

Concepts of dignity and its implication for rule of law

作　　者：李晓亮[1] 庞正[1] 

机构地区：[1]南京师范大学法学院,江苏南京210097

出　　处：《东南大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第6期60-69,147,共10页Journal of Southeast University(Philosophy and Social Science)

基　　金：国家社会科学基金重点项目"建设社会主义法治文化研究"(14AZD144)成果之一

摘　　要：关于尊严概念的规范性,目前学界存在四种主要的质疑观点。通过语用分析可以发现尊严概念是一个具有多重规范性的观念集合,是人类从不同视角对自我的理解和认同。在由"个体—共同体"和"先天—后天"两个向度构成的坐标上,存在着基于权威的尊严、基于理性的尊严、基于德行的尊严和基于传统的尊严等四种观念类型,它们分别在各自语境下拥有特定的规范性内涵。尊严概念与法治理论密切相关,形式合法性的法治观与基于理性的尊严观具有亲和关系,实质合法性的法治观是尊严诸观念协同作用的结果。There are largely four academic arguments about the normalization of concept of dignity. Our pragmatic anal-ysis shows that the concept of dignity includes multiple normalizations which are in essence human's self-under-standing and self-identification from different perspectives. On the coordinate plane with two dimensional num-ber lines of individual-community and nature-nurture,there exist four concepts,i.e. privilege-based dignity,rea-son-based dignity,virtue-based dignity and tradition-based dignity,each of which carries specific normative connotation.

关 键 词：尊严 自主性 法治 权利 

分 类 号：D920.0[政治法律—法学]