CEO Power, CEO Age and the Policy Instrument Property of State-Owned-Enterprises  

作　　者：Sheng Zhang Yuan Li Jingyu Chen 

机构地区：[1]School of F-inance, zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China [2]Collaborative Innovation Center of Industrial Upgrading and Regional Finance, Wuhan430073, China

出　　处：《Frontiers of Business Research in China》2016年第3期507-524,共18页中国高等学校学术文摘·工商管理研究（英文版）

摘　　要：In this paper, we examine the relationship between CEO power, CEO age and the efficiency of policy implementation in listed corporations controlled by each province＇s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SASAC） in China. We find that CEOs with more power implement policy are more efficiently. We also find that younger powerful CEOs will act more effectively than their older competitors. The reason for the difference is that younger powerful CEOs in state-owned companies are incentivized to implement their policy tasks to gain promotions or political capital. Our results are important to future SOE reform and to understanding the characteristics of SOEs as policy instruments.In this paper, we examine the relationship between CEO power, CEO age and the efficiency of policy implementation in listed corporations controlled by each province＇s State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission （SASAC） in China. We find that CEOs with more power implement policy are more efficiently. We also find that younger powerful CEOs will act more effectively than their older competitors. The reason for the difference is that younger powerful CEOs in state-owned companies are incentivized to implement their policy tasks to gain promotions or political capital. Our results are important to future SOE reform and to understanding the characteristics of SOEs as policy instruments.

关 键 词：CEO power state-owned enterprise policy instrument difference indifference in differences 

分 类 号：F279.241[经济管理—企业管理] F272.91[经济管理—国民经济]