基于技术许可的校企合作创新利益分配研究  

On Benifit Distribution of College-enterprise Cooperation Innovation based on Technology Licensing

作　　者：刘和东[1] 谢婷[1] LIU Hedong XIE Ting(School of Economics ＆ Management, Nanjing Tech University, Nanjing 211800, China)

机构地区：[1]南京工业大学经济与管理学院,江苏南京211800

出　　处：《南京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》2016年第4期91-95,共5页Journal of Nanjing Tech University：Social Science Edition

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(15BGL031);国家自然科学基金项目(71473120);江苏省高校"青蓝工程"中青年学术带头人培养对象资助项目(苏教师〔2014〕23号);江苏省高校哲学社会科学研究重点项目(2014ZDIXM014)

摘　　要：依据技术许可模式中大学与企业合作的特点,设计利益分配博弈模型,分析了基于技术许可的校企合作创新利益分配的关键因素及其影响。研究发现:大学的利益分配与大学协同度成正比,企业的利益分配与大学协同度成反比;合作成员的利益分配应随自身要素贡献系数的增大而增大,随自身要素成本系数的增大而减小;大学的最优线性分配比例随自身技术开发能力的提升而增大,随企业商业化能力的提升而减小,而企业的最优线性分配比例随自身商业化能力的提升而增大,随大学技术开发能力的提高而减小。Based on the characteristics of technology licensing in college-enterprise cooperation,a game model was designed to analyze the key factors and their impact in benifit distribution on technology innovation and licensing of school-enterprise cooperation. We found that benefit distributed to the colleges or universities are directly proportional to their coordination level; while those distributed to enterprises are inversely proportional to the coordinnation level. Profits distributed to the members should increase with their contribution and decrease with their factor cost. Colleges＇ proportion of optimal linear distribution ratio varies,enhancing with the colleges＇ technological development capacity and decreasing with the enterprises＇ commercial capability; while that proportion of enterprises is affected by the two factors otherwise.

关 键 词：技术许可 校企合作创新 协同创新 利益分配 

分 类 号：F273.1[经济管理—企业管理]