国有企业并购影响高管升职加薪吗——基于国企高管双重身份的视角  

Do Mergers and Acquisitions of State-owned Enterprises Impact Executives Promotion and Compensation——Based on Double Identity of Executive of state-owned Enterprises

作　　者：李济含 刘淑莲[1] 

机构地区：[1]东北财经大学会计学院,辽宁大连116025

出　　处：《山西财经大学学报》2016年第12期89-102,共14页Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金项目(71172120)

摘　　要：采用2006-2015年沪、深两市A股主板上市国有公司为研究样本,考察并购对高管晋升与薪酬提升的影响。研究发现,国企并购能够显著增加高管晋升与薪酬提升的可能性。并且,在此过程中存在一个业绩门槛,当公司业绩高于门槛值时,企业并购与高管晋升显著正相关;当公司业绩低于门槛值时,企业并购与薪酬提升显著正相关。本文研究结论证实,国企高管的政治与经济身份具有不同的激励目标并引发较大的行为差异,为国企高管激励契约改革提供一定的经验证据。Using the research samples of state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges from 2006 to2015, we investigate the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the executive promotion and compensation. We find that in state-owned enterprises, mergers and acquisitions can significantly increase the likelihood of executive promotion and compensation improvement. And there is a performance threshold in these two relationships. When the corporate performance is above the performance threshold, mergers and acquisitions and executive promotion have a significant positive correlation; when the corporate performance is below the performance threshold, mergers and acquisitions and executive compensation have a significant positive correlation. Research conclusion of this paper confirms that in state-owned enterprise, the political and economic identity of executives with different incentive targets, leads to a great behavior differences, which provides some empirical evidence for executive incentive contract reform of state-owned enterprises.

关 键 词：国有企业并购 高管晋升 高管薪酬 

分 类 号：F276.1[经济管理—企业管理]