新电改下售电企业创新增值服务动力演化博弈分析  

Dynamic Evolutionary Game Analysis on Innovation Value-added Services of Electricity Sales Enterprise Under The New Power System Reform

作　　者：张静静[1] Zhang Jingjing(School of Management, China University of Mining ＆ Technology （Beijing）, Beijing 100083, China)

机构地区：[1]中国矿业大学(北京)管理学院,北京100083

出　　处：《煤炭经济研究》2016年第9期59-65,共7页Coal Economic Research

摘　　要：将新电改条件下即将成为新的售电主体的企业进一步划分为有发电资源的售电企业和无发电资源的售电企业。运用演化博弈理论,构建两类售电企业的复制动态模型,分析其在提供多样化的创新增值服务过程中的动态演化过程。研究结果表明:两类售电主体的创新增值服务动力主要受其在售电市场的市场份额、创新增值服务水平与市场需求的差异程度、创新增值服务成本对服务差距的弹性系数的影响。市场份额对售电侧企业创新增值服务动力和行为选择具有正向推动作用,而服务质量与市场需求的差异程度和创新增值服务成本对服务差距的弹性系数,则对售电侧企业的创新增值服务动力和行为选择具有反向抑制作用。This paper furtherly divides enterprises who will become new electricity sales main body into two types of electricity selling enterprises： electricity sales enterprise with resource to generate electricity and electricity sales enterprise without resource to generate electricity. Evolutionary game theory is used to build two types of electricity sales enterprises＇ replication dynamic model. This paper analyzes its dynamic evolution process during providing diversified innovative value-added services.The results show that： the innovative value-added services motivation of the two types of electricity sales providers are mainly driven by their market share, the degree of difference between the innovative value-added service level and the market demand, and the elasticity coefficient that innovation value-added service costs affecting service gap. The market share has positive motivation role to the value-added services and behavior choice of electricity sales enterprise, but, the degree of difference between the innovative value-added service level and the market demand, and the elasticity coefficient that innovation value-added service costs affecting service gap, has reverse effects to the value-added services and behavior choice of electricity sales enterprise.

关 键 词：新电改 售电企业 创新增值服务 演化博弈 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]