女性CFO、终极产权与上市公司融资行为  

Female CFOs,Ultimate Ownership and Firm Financing Behavior

作　　者：张爱民[1] 刘文月[1] 陈涛琴 

机构地区：[1]华东理工大学商学院 [2]复旦大学管理学院

出　　处：《财会通讯（下）》2016年第12期104-108,共5页Communication of Finance and Accounting

摘　　要：本文以2003-2013年中国A股上市公司为样本,分析了女性CFO、终极产权与上市公司融资行为之间的关系。研究发现,女性CFO及其风险规避特质表现出更稳健的融资政策,具体表现为企业负债总量降低、内源性融资增加,同时,通过减少短期借款、增加长期借款进而降低了企业的财务风险。进一步还发现:在国有企业女性CFO主要通过减少债务总量和短期借款、增加长期借款来降低企业的财务风险,而在民营企业,女性CFO更倾向于增加内源性融资来规避财务风险。Based on a sample of Chinese A-Share listed firms during 2003-2013,we use the method of Difference-In-Difference to examine the relationships between female CFO,ultimate ownership and firms' financing behavior.We find that female CFO has a more preference for prudent financing policy.The female CFO has a negative effect on the extent of firms' debt and short-loan,and a positive effect on long-loan and undistributed profit.Furthermore,this effect is more significant in the sample of SOEs for the strict supervision by government.In order to get a more robust conclusion.we use the method of PSM testing for robustness in our research.

关 键 词：女性CFO 终极产权 融资行为 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理]