易腐品供应链质量安全信号传递博弈  

Signaling Game about Quality and Safety of Perishable Product Supply Chain

作　　者：唐润[1] 彭洋洋[1] 王海燕[1] 范宇翔[1] 雷勋平[2] 

机构地区：[1]南京财经大学管理科学与工程学院,江苏南京210023 [2]铜陵学院工商管理学院,安徽铜陵244000

出　　处：《系统工程》2016年第9期97-102,共6页Systems Engineering

基　　金：国家社会科学基金资助项目(16BGL130)

摘　　要：由于信息不对称和易腐品自身特点,其供应链质量安全控制问题成为管理的一个难点,本文主要考虑温度和时间因素对易腐品供应链质量安全的影响,构建动态的易腐品质量安全水平因子和市场需求函数,考虑保鲜成本、损耗成本、监管处罚等因素,分析零售商与消费者之间信号博弈的分离均衡、混同均衡及准分离均衡的实现及条件,探讨零售商根据质量安全水平因子,决策最佳销售时段、控温水平及监管方引导市场分离均衡策略,避免逆向选择的影响。Due to the asymmetric information and fresh product＇s characteristics,quality and safety control of supply chain become a difficult problem. In this paper, we mainly consider time and temperature as the dynamic factors which influence quality and safety of fresh food suppty chain.Next,dynamic factorsof perishable product quality and safety, market demand functionare built. Considering fresh-keeping cost, loss cost, regulatory penalties and other factors, the precondition and implementation of separating equilibrium, pooling equilibrium and semi-separating equilibrium are analyzed in the signal game between retailer and consumers. Finally; best sales period, temperature control level and strategiesof regulators to guide market separation equilibrium are analyzed according to the factors oI quality and safety level. This study will help retaileravoid the influence of adverse selection.

关 键 词：易腐品供应链 质量安全 信号传递 博弈 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理]