基于制造商投资和讨价还价模型的零售通道费形成机理研究  

THE MECHANISM OF SLOTTING ALLOWANCE WITH BARGAINING MODEL AND MANUFACTURES' EFFORT

作　　者：应珊珊 朱蓓[1] 高洁[1] 

机构地区：[1]上海财经大学国际工商管理学院,邮政编码200433

出　　处：《经济理论与经济管理》2016年第12期83-92,共10页Economic Theory and Business Management

基　　金：教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"(NCET-10-0560);上海财经大学研究生创新基金资助项目(2014110574)的支持

摘　　要：通道费的形成机理以及对其的规制政策一直是个未解的难题。本文在上游制造商之间的努力存在外部性的条件下考虑上游的投资决策,基于纳什不对称讨价还价模型考察了努力外部性、努力成本、相对谈判势力等因素对通道费的影响,以及通道费收取对生产投资的影响和福利效应。研究表明,通道费的形成不仅取决于制造商的相对谈判势力,而且取决于制造商投资努力的成本以及外部性的大小。即便制造商完全没有谈判势力,零售商也会选择向制造商支付特许经营费的方式激励制造商提供努力。此外,通道费在一定条件下可能会损害消费者福利,因而把通道费纳入滥用市场支配地位的行为范围,对其根据合理推断原则进行判别具有一定的必要性。The formation mechanism of slotting allowance and the regulation have been a dilemma for a long time. This paper incorporates the manufactures＇ investment and externality between manufactures into the Nash bargaining model over slotting fees, to see their influence on slotting allowance as well as the welfare effect of slotting allowance. This paper shows that slotting allowance is not only affected by the relative bargaining power between manufactures and retailers, but also by manufactures＇ effort costs and externality. Though manufactures have no bargaining power, the retailer may also pay the franchise fee to the manufacture to encourage its effort. Moreover, in some condition slotting allowance will harm consumer welfare. Therefore, it is reasonable to treat cases of slotting allowance as behaviors of abusing market power and apply rule-of-reason into its judgment.

关 键 词：通道费 纳什谈判 投资努力 外部性 

分 类 号：F274[经济管理—企业管理] F724.2[经济管理—国民经济]