交叉持股、内部人控制与经营绩效——基于沪深上市公司的经验研究  

Cross-shareholding,Insider Control and Operating Performance——Based on the Empirical Research on Listed Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen

作　　者：黄昌富[1] 张晶晶[1] 

机构地区：[1]三峡大学经济与管理学院,湖北宜昌443002

出　　处：《商业研究》2016年第12期102-109,共8页Commercial Research

基　　金：三峡大学研究生科研创新基金项目;项目编号:2015CX082

摘　　要：本文以我国2010-2014年沪深上市公司为样本,考察交叉持股、内部人控制与经营绩效的关系。实证结果表明,交叉持股与经营绩效存在显著的倒U型关系,交叉持股在一定的范围内有助于经营绩效的改善,但是超过一定的阈值后,经营绩效反而会下降;交叉持股与内部人控制之间存在显著的U型关系,在拐点之前监督效应占优,而超过拐点后侵占效应则更为明显;内部人控制在交叉持股与经营绩效的关系中具有中介传导作用,交叉持股通过影响内部人控制,进而影响企业的经营绩效。Based on the samples of cross-shareholding listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2014, the paper studies the relationship among cross-shareholding, insider control and operating performance. The empirical re- suits find that the relation between cross shareholding and operating performance is inverse U shape： cross-shareholding can help to improve operating performance within a certain range, however, if the specific threshold is exceeded, the op- erating performance will drop instead; the cross shareholding has an obvious U-shaped relationship with insider control： before the turning point the dominant effect is supervision, and after the turning point, the occupation effect is more obvi- ous; moreover, the insider control acts as a mediator in the inverse U-shaped relationship between cross shareholding and operating performance and by affecting insider control, the cross shareholding can influence operating performance further.

关 键 词：交叉持股 内部人控制 经营绩效 中介效应 

分 类 号：F270.3[经济管理—企业管理]