地方政府税收竞争对环境污染影响的比较研究——基于全国及区域视角  

A Comparative Study on Effects of Local Government Tax Competition on Environmental Pollution:Based on National and Regional Perspective

作　　者：张根能[1] 董伟婷 张珩月 

机构地区：[1]西安理工大学经济与管理学院,陕西西安710054

出　　处：《生态经济》2017年第1期28-32,42,共6页Ecological Economy

基　　金：国家社会科学基金项目(14XJY006);西安理工大学教师博士科研启动经费资助项目(107-211103);西安理工大学人文社会科学重点项目(2014RWZD001)

摘　　要：基于2000-2012年我国29个省份的数据,用工业废气排放量代表环境污染程度,实证比较分析了地区税负水平和环境政策两种税收竞争手段对环境污染的影响。结果表明:税负降低使东、西部工业废气的排放增加,显著降低环境质量,但全国和中部却表现相反;地方政府执行宽松的环境政策使全国、东部和中部工业废气污染加剧,出现"趋劣竞争"现象;经济增长与环境污染之间的环境库茨涅茨曲线仅在东部和中部成立;其他控制变量的表现也各有不同。Based on the data of 29 provinces of China from 2000-2012, this paper empirically compares the effect of two kinds of tax competition of regional tax burden and environmental policy on environmental pollution by utilizing industrial waste gas emissions to represent the level of environmental pollution. The result shows that low tax burden indeed increases the industrial waste gas emissions in the east and west, deteriorating the quality of environment significantly, but reduces the industrial waste gas emissions in national and central areas. The local government executes loose environmental policy which leads to the exacerbation of industrial waste gas pollution and the phenomenon of ＂race to the bottom＂ in national, eastern and central areas except the west. The environmental Kuznets inverted curve between economic growth and environmental pollution establishes in the east and central area. The performances of other control variables are also different.

关 键 词：税收竞争 环境污染 工业废气 面板数据 

分 类 号：F062.2[经济管理—政治经济学]