集团现金管控程度对EVA考核的过度投资抑制效果的影响——基于中国上市央企的实证分析  

Impact of Group′s Cash Control Degree on Inhibiting Effect of EVA Assessment on Excessive Investment:Empirical Analysis on Listed Central Enterprises

作　　者：张建平[1] 王实[1] 倪晨阳 

机构地区：[1]对外经济贸易大学国际商学院,北京100029

出　　处：《技术经济》2016年第12期111-118,共8页Journal of Technology Economics

基　　金：国家自然科学基金重点项目"中国企业的转型升级战略及其竞争优势研究"(71332007)

摘　　要：利用2007—2014年中国沪深两市上市央企的数据,研究了国资委针对央企推行的EVA考核对央企过度投资行为的抑制效果,并考察了央企集团的现金管控程度对EVA考核的过度投资抑制效果的影响。研究结果表明:EVA考核确实对央企的过度投资行为有显著的抑制作用;央企集团的现金管控程度越高,EVA考核对其过度投资的抑制效果越明显。据此指出央企集团总部对现金进行强势控制有助于发挥EVA考核体系的有效性。Using the data of central enterprises listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market from 2007 to 2014,this paper studies the inhibiting effectof EVA assessment implemented by State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State Council on the over-investment behaviorof central enterprises,and the impact of cash control degree of central enterprise group on the inhibiting effect of EVA assessment. The results show as fol-lows： EVA assessment does has obvious inhibiting effect on the over-investment behavior of central enterprises; the higher the cash control degree, themore obvious the inhibiting effect of EVA assessment on over-investment. Finally,it points out that it helps to enhance the effectiveness of EVA assess-ment system that the headquarter of central enterprise group manage and control cash strongly.

关 键 词：EVA考核 过度投资 现金管控程度 

分 类 号：F275[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]