基于演化博弈的供应链成员实施RFID技术的投资决策分析  

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Investment Decision-Making for Using RFID Technology on Supply Chain

作　　者：王文杰[1] 赵道致[1] 

机构地区：[1]天津大学经济与管理学部,天津300072

出　　处：《重庆理工大学学报（自然科学）》2016年第12期154-161,共8页Journal of Chongqing University of Technology：Natural Science

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072155)

摘　　要：针对零售商和供应商组成的两级供应链系统,研究了RFID技术应用于供应链的演化机理问题。首先探讨了初始投入成本、RFID技术的超额收益和上下游相互依赖关系对博弈双方投资决策的影响。在此基础上,通过引入成本分担机制和惩罚机制,对演化模型进行Pareto改进,从理论上分析了模型存在最优分担比例的条件和相关管理启示。最后,采用数值分析研究了博弈双方相互依赖程度和零售商成本分担比例等参数对供应链演化结果的影响。研究结果表明:零售商和供应商均实施RFID技术的概率与初始投入成本负相关,与超额收益和相互依赖程度正相关;在一定条件下,零售商存在最优的成本分担比例来促进供应链实现RFID技术革新,同时适当的惩罚力度有利于降低博弈方的机会主义;供应商对零售商的依赖程度对双方均投资RFID技术的影响更显著。For a two-echelon supply chain system consists of suppliers and retailers,this paper conducted a research on evolutionary mechanism of investment decision-making for using RFID technology. Firstly, the effects of the initial investment cost, excess income of RFID and the interdependent relationship were explored. On this basis,the Pareto improvement of game model wasanalyzed through the introduction of cost-sharing mechanism and punishment mechanism,resulting in the conditions of optimal sharing ratio and related management inspiration theoretically. Also numerical analysis on the effectiveness of the interdependence degree and cost sharing ratio were performed. The results indicate that the probability of installation of RFID on both partners has a negative correlation with initial investment cost and a positive correlation with excess income of RFID and the interdependent degree; under certain condition,there is an optimal cost-sharing ratio for retailers to promote the technology innovation on supply chain,meanwhile,appropriate punishment helps to reduce opportunism; the decision of investing RFID made by both sides is more sensitive to the dependence of suppliers on retailers.

关 键 词：RFID 演化博弈 激励机制 

分 类 号：O21[理学—概率论与数理统计]