基于成本—质量双标准的企业激励机制研究  

Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Enterprises Based on the Double Standard of Quality and Cost

作　　者：孟凡生[1] 杨雨艨 

机构地区：[1]哈尔滨工程大学经济管理学院,黑龙江哈尔滨150001

出　　处：《工业工程与管理》2016年第6期24-30,37,共8页Industrial Engineering and Management

基　　金：国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072075);教育部博士点基金资助项目(20092304110017)

摘　　要：针对产能过剩背景下企业难以通过提升产量而增加绩效的问题,研究了以提升工人成本控制和质量改进积极性为目的的激励机制。通过建立企业管理者和工人间基于成本和质量双标准的委托代理模型,并分析相关参数分别对工人在两任务中的最优投入水平和最优风险分担水平的影响,发现了由于某项任务的投入过低而可能导致的激励失衡问题,进而给出相应解决方案。研究表明:①在某任务上,工人能力的提升、惰性的降低和风险的降低均可提升该任务的激励强度,并使其投入另一任务的部分努力转移至该任务;②某任务参数的改变对工人在该任务中的风险分担及努力投入的影响幅度大于另一任务;③任务关联性的改变可使工人的努力投入发生转移,且关联性越大,转移程度越大,而系数的增减则决定了转移的方向。Focusing on the problem that it is difficult for enterprises to increase performance by increasing production in the context of excess production capacity,the incentive mechanism for improving the cost control and quality improvement initiative of workers was studied By establishing the principalagent model based on the double standard of cost and quality between enterprise manager and workers,and analyzing the effects of relevant parameters on the optimal investment level and the optimal risk sharing level of workers in the two task,it is discovered the problem of incentive imbalance because of the low investment of a task,then give the corresponding solutioa Results show that：1） In a task,the ability enchancement of workers and the reduction of the inertia and risks can enhance the incentive strength of the task,and make part of the effort putting in another task transfer to the task;2） The parameters change of a certain task influences its incentive situation greater than the other task;3） The change of task relevance can also make the workers efforts investment transferred.The stronger the relevance is,the stronger the degree of transition is.Increase or decrease of correlation coefficient determines the direction of transfer.

关 键 词：成本控制 质量改进 委托代理 努力转移 

分 类 号：F275.3[经济管理—企业管理]