戴震哲学中两种自由之间的张力  

Dai Zhen and two types of freedom in his philosophy

作　　者：王英[1] 

机构地区：[1]浙江越秀外国语学院思想政治理论教研部,浙江绍兴312004

出　　处：《河北师范大学学报（哲学社会科学版）》2016年第6期23-30,共8页Journal of Hebei Normal University(Philosophy and Social Sciences)

摘　　要：戴震面对的问题有三个方面:"势"之恣睢;"理"之形式化;庸人之昏惑。他主要面对的是前两个方面的问题,而当时这两个方面已捆绑,"理"的解释权、使用权在"势","理"成为"势"之奴,而弱势者已诉告无门。他主要通过"分理"消解"理"的形式化,使得理在事中、理在情中、理在欲中,人们可据实际情形独立行使判断力。与"势"抗拒的"分理"包含着权利意识以及政治自由的端倪,有一定"消极自由"的精神。然而,针对庸人之昏惑,戴震并没有放弃孟子以来儒学主流的"性善"说,在对人性的看法上,仍包含着人必须积极向上、扩充的设定,保留着一定的"积极自由"的底线。在他这里,前一种自由是主要的,而主张"分理"如何不至于失去儒学的底线,戴震对此有所忽略。Dai Zhen, a Chinese philosopher, claims that power and reasoning are interwoven the previ- ous of which acts as a vehicle that explicates the latter. Likewise, reasoning is venerable so as to be enslaved. Therefore, the philosopher attempts to dilute the format of reasoning in action, emotion and desires according to which man exercises his judgment. Otherwise, the political freedom turns negative. As of the sloth, Dai Zhen turns to Mencius to account for the Confucian benevolence which speaks for human nature towards enthusiasm about active freedom.

关 键 词：势 理 分理 消极自由 自由意志 

分 类 号：B249.6[哲学宗教—中国哲学]