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作 者:陈骏[1] CHEN Jun(School of Accounting, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815)
出 处:《财贸研究》2016年第6期131-142,共12页Finance and Trade Research
基 金:国家自然科学基金青年项目"政策性负担;盈余管理及其经济后果"(71202172);江苏省"青蓝工程"优秀骨干教师(苏教师[2012]39号)
摘 要:从内部控制的视角,检验宏观税收负担影响企业盈余管理行为的传导机制,提出两项竞争性研究假说,即监督动机假说和防御动机假说。实证研究发现,企业所处地区税收负担越重,则内部控制有效性越高;高税收负担地区的企业,盈余管理程度越高则内部控制有效性越强,且这一关系在正向盈余管理组中更显著,经验证据支持防御动机假设。研究结论表明,税收负担过重会推动企业强化内部控制建设,但目的并非旨在加强内部监督,相反可能是为了掩饰其盈余管理行为,以应对税收征管机关的稽查与处罚。This paper empirically tests effects of tax burden on earnings management from the perspective of internal control,specifically including two competing hypothesis: defensive motivation and supervising motivation. The empirical findings show that the higher the regional tax burden is,the more effectiveness the companies' internal control is. And,the higher the degree of earnings management is,the more effectiveness the enterprises' internal control is in the region of high tax burden,and especially for the positive earnings management group,which support the defensive motivation hypothesis. The conclusion indicates that the overw eighed tax burden has a positive role on corporate internal control,but this positive role is aim to cover up the behavior of earnings management rather than limit this behavior in order to response the tax inspection and punishment of tax authority.
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