浙江民营上市公司股权激励实施效果研究  

The Research of Equity Incentive Effect on Private Listed Company in Zhejiang

作　　者：韩业顺 应志方[1] Han Ye-shun Ying Zhi-fang(Business School of Ningbo University,315211,Ningbo, Zhejiang, China)

机构地区：[1]宁波大学商学院,浙江宁波315211

出　　处：《特区经济》2016年第12期87-89,共3页Special Zone Economy

摘　　要：股权激励是一种缓解因两权分离所导致的委托代理问题的长期激励机制。而以民营上市公司为主的浙江地区,股权激励的实施对民营上市公司的经营业绩产生了怎样的影响?限制性股票与股票期权两种股权激励模式相比较哪种激励模式的激励效果更显著?基于以上问题,本文采用配对样本T检验和线性回归方法进行实证研究。结果表明:一是股权激励的实施对浙江民营上市公司经营业绩具有一定的提升效果,但效果不显著;二是针对浙江民营上市公司而言,限制性股票的实施效果要好于股票期权。Equity incentive is a kind of long-term incentive mechanism and it alleviates the principal-agent problem caused by separation of two powers. What is the relationship between the implementation of equity incentive and the performance of private listed companies in Zhejiang？ In Zhejiang＇s private listed companies, which mode has more significant incentive effect between restricted stock and stock option？ Based on this, this paper uses the paired sample T test and linear regression method for empirical research. The results show：First,the implementation of equity incentive has certain effect on the performance of private listed companies in Zhejiang, but the improvement is small and the effect is not obvious.Second,the effect of the restricted stock incentive model is better than the stock option for private listed companies in Zhejiang.

关 键 词：股权激励 民营上市公司 实施效果 公司经营业绩 

分 类 号：F272.92[经济管理—企业管理] F832.51[经济管理—国民经济]